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Abstract
We develop an alternative theory to the aggregate matching function in which
workers search for jobs through a network of firms: the labor flow network. The lack
of an edge between two companies indicates the impossibility of labor flows between
them due to high frictions. In equilibrium, firms’ hiring behavior correlates through
the network, generating highly disaggregated local unemployment. Hence, aggregation
depends on the topology of the network in non-trivial ways. This theory provides
new micro-foundations for the Beveridge curve, wage dispersion, and the employer-size
premium. We apply our model to employer-employee matched records and find that
network topologies with Pareto-distributed connections cause disproportionately large
changes on aggregate unemployment under high labor supply elasticity.
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1 Introduction
Unemployment is a fundamental economic problem resulting from several distinct social
mechanisms. These include people becoming separated from their jobs and searching for
new positions; firms opening vacancies and searching for new workers; and recruiters finding
job seekers throughout the labor market. Due to the complexity involved in simultaneously
accounting for these and other mechanisms, the composition of unemployment has been
studied under the umbrella of labor market frictions. A simplified way to account for these
frictions has been to assume that companies and job seekers meet at random in the job
market. Failure to coordinate these encounters can then be attributed to frictions.
The seminal work of Hall (1979), Pissarides (1979), and Bowden (1980) paved the way
for the application of random matching models in order to integrate frictions into equilib-
rium models. A reduced way to capture these matching processes is through the aggregate
matching function (AMF). In its most typical form, the AMF takes two quantities as in-
puts –total unemployment and total number of vacancies– and returns the total number
of successful matches. If the AMF produces unsuccessful matches, even when there are
more vacancies than unemployed, it means that the labor market has frictions. Like any
aggregation, the AMF implicitly assumes certain regularity in the matching process. These
assumptions are convenient for mathematical tractability, but they come with the cost of
sacrificing structural information about the labor market frictions. For example, if there
are clusters of firms that ‘trap’ labor flows, this information would be destroyed by means
of aggregation. Of course, whether it is important to consider such clusters depends on
the research question. Nevertheless, today’s major challenges for labor policy are inherently
dynamic and they demand a granular view of labor markets. Hence, we provide a framework
to advance our understanding of labor markets in this direction.
In order to address the limitations of the AMF, numerous models about its micro-
foundations have been formulated. In some cases, they rely on theoretical assumptions that
are difficult to observe through empirical data. In other cases, micro-foundations can be
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extremely specific mechanisms that are difficult to extrapolate to more general contexts,
or to link to other mechanisms under a common framework (e.g., geographical distance,
social networks, skills mismatch, etc.). Furthermore, even when it is possible to account for
multiple micro-foundations simultaneously, it does not take much to end up with overly-
complicated models. Therefore, developing an overarching framework that accounts for the
highly heterogeneous and complex structure of labor market frictions is something desirable
from both positive (to understand labor dynamics) and normative (for policy purposes)
points of view. In this paper, we propose a new framework to achieve this goal, inspired in
micro-level empirical observations on how individuals move from one company to another
throughout their careers.
When one thinks about labor market frictions, there are numerous mechanisms that
come to mind, for example, social networks, information asymmetries, geographical distance,
industrial compatibility, etc. Altogether, these frictions interact and shape the landscape
through which individuals flow from one job to an anther, often experiencing unemployment
spells in between. Our theory is not about specific frictions and does not propose new ones;
instead, it provides a tool to study unemployment while taking into account the complex
landscape that emerges from all frictions and their interactions. The main assumption is
that the labor market lives on top of a network of firms. This network reveals the pathways
that are most likely to be navigated by job seekers, constraining mobility and bounding
unemployment to certain locations in the network; something extremely useful for policy
purposes. In this network, the presence or absence of an edge represents a categorical
relation between two firms, resulting from the frictions that determine the amount of labor
mobility between them. More specifically, the absence of an edge means that labor flows
between two disconnected firms are unlikely due to high frictions (at least in the short run),
while the opposite is expected for connected firms. Together, firms and edges from the labor
flow network (LFN) of the economy.1 In the same spirit in which the AMF provides an
1We must clarify that the LFN is assumed to be exogenous. While the reader may wonder about its
endogenous nature, this would be of a different time-scale and complexity. In other words, we decide to
assume an exogenous LFN in order to study the effect that its topology has on the composition of aggregate
unemployment, while leaving the inquiry of its emergence for a different study.
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analytic tool to mediate the matching process, the LFN provides a structured object that
allows us to analyze labor dynamics in great detail. Another analogy can be drawn from the
urns-balls literature (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). Here the urns are distributed across
individual firms, and jumps between them are restricted by the connections between them.
In fact, the classical urns-balls model is a special case of ours; the case in which the network
topology is regular (e.g. there is little variation in the number of connections of the nodes).
Therefore, the topology of the LFN plays a crucial role in determining unemployment.
As we will show in this paper, the empirical topology of the LFN, makes aggregation of
unemployment non-trivial. Furthermore, when firms’ hiring behavior correlates through
the LFN, aggregate unemployment may be significantly higher than expected under the
assumption of no frictional structure. Our main finding is that, in the presence of a high
labor supply elasticity, the level of aggregate unemployment is strongly dependent on the
structure of the LFN. Furthermore, the distribution of unemployed in the economy is directly
linked to the specific topology of the LFN. Our framework provides a new way to think about
labor dynamics such that the highly heterogeneous structure of all labor market frictions
is taken into account to a great degree of detail. This can be extremely useful to study
problems where the propagation of shocks and policies shape the speed and reallocation of
labor differently, depending on the specific ‘pockets’ of workers and firms affected.
1.1 Related works
The idea of limiting job search to groups of firms is not new or uncommon. For example,
mismatch models posit that coordination failures between firms and workers are due to
frictions that prevent job seekers from freely moving between submarkets. Conventionally,
mobility between submarkets is studied by grouping firms into different categories and an-
alyzing the labor flows that take place between such groups. Since the early contribution
of Lucas and Prescott (1974), multi-sector matching models have offered a variety of ways
to think about frictions between submarkets. An example can be found in Shimer (2007),
where inter-submarket flows are modeled as a process where workers and jobs are randomly
4
reassigned to any submarket every period. This reassignment originates from an exogenous
stochastic process in which movements between any two submarkets are equally likely. Once
workers and jobs have been reallocated, matching takes place in each submarket through
local AMFs. In contrast, Sahin et al. (2014) assume that, provided with information on
vacancies, shocks, and efficiencies, workers periodically choose a submarket to move into.
Once labor is reallocated, match creation and destruction take place in each submarket.
An alternative approach proposed by Herz and van Rens (2011) assumes that workers can
search for vacancies in any submarket and firms can search for workers in the same way.
There are costs associated to searching in each submarket. Therefore, matching depends on
the optimal decisions of workers and firms about where to search. Other models combine
some of these elements in the tradition of Lucas and Prescott (Alvarez and Shimer, 2011;
Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers, 2013; Lkhagvasuren, 2009; Kambourov and Manovskii, 2009).
On the other hand, a related strand of research studies submarkets as spatially delimited
units (generally cities) (Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2009; Moretti, 2011; Manning and Petrongolo,
2017; Kennan and Walker, 2011). These models focus on the effect of local shocks when
the economy is in spatial equilibrium, which is useful when we know the spatial location of
interest. However, as units of aggregation, spatial partitions can be rather arbitrary.
Whether it is for the whole economy or for submarkets, there are a number of problems
that arise from viewing matching in aggregate terms, and here we mention a few. First, when
an AMF is responsible of pairing up workers and vacancies, it is assumed that all matches
are equally likely. This neglects the importance that specific firms have in reallocating labor
within a submarket. Second, defining a submarket is an arbitrary choice that might be
well suited for a specific problem, but not necessarily for a broader context. Since these
classifications are usually built for taxonomic purposes, they are not designed to minimize
inter-submarket flows and maximize intra-submarket, which would capture the structural
information of labor market frictions. This problem has been pointed out by Jackman and
Roper (1987) in their classical paper on structural unemployment:
... “there seems no particular reason why unemployed workers should regard
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themselves as specific to a particular industry, and in practice the unemployed
do move between industries reasonably easily.” (Jackman and Roper, 1987, pg.
19)
Third, aggregation often assumes that any worker from one submarket is equally likely to
transition to another submarket. Furthermore, it ignores the fact that only a few firms are
responsible for inter-submarket transitions. These firms are crucial to overall labor mobility
since they are diffusion outlets or bottlenecks in the process of labor reallocation. Fourth,
aggregation ‘smooths’ the search landscape, enabling firm-to-firm flows that are highly un-
likely in the short run. In fact, Guerrero and Lo´pez (2015) have shown that the hypothesis
of an AMF is rejected as an explanation of empirical firm-to-firm flows, even at the level of
submarkets. Using community detection methods for network data, on one hand, Guerrero
and Axtell (2013) show that conventional classifications such as industries and geographical
regions poorly capture the clusters of labor that are detected in employer-employee matched
micro-data. On the other, Schmutte (2014) uses more aggregate data to perform a com-
munity detection analysis that reveals four clusters that do not correspond to traditional
ways of classifying labor submarkets. Finally, there are, of course, models where mobility
decisions between submarkets are heterogeneous and take place between workers of different
types (Kennan and Walker, 2011; Cortes, 2015). This however, does not solve the problem
of homogenizing the matching process within groups of firms and omitting the structure
of labor flows within a submarket. For these reasons, a framework that does not rely on
arbitrary aggregations to define submarkets would represent a significant methodological
improvement. Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) have suggested the use of graph theory as a
potential tool to overcome arbitrary aggregations. We take this approach in order to depart
from the established notions of submarkets and, instead, look at labor dynamics as random
walks on graphs.
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1.2 A network approach
Our approach is inspired in a local job search mechanism. When a person looks for a job in
search of a vacancy, he or she approaches a group of firms that are ‘accessible’ in the short
run. Such group is determined by the frictions of the labor market and we assume that it is
specific to the firm where this person was last employed. We represent the correspondence
between firms and their respective groups of accessible companies through a LFN. In this
network, firms are represented by nodes. An edge between enterprises i and j means that
frictions are such that j will be accessible to employees of i and vice versa. Therefore,
edges have a categorical nature that represents the possibility (or impossibility in their
absence) of labor flows between firms. Firm i’s edges determine its first neighbors, which
are equivalent to the group of accessible firms to someone employed in i. We refer to these
firms as i’s neighbor firms. As a person progresses through his or her career, he or she
traverses the economy by taking jobs at the neighbor firms of past employers. This gradual
navigation process is fundamentally different from previous approaches because the identity
of the firm (i.e., its position in the LFN) matters in order to determine the employment
prospects of the job seeker. There is a number reasons why this is important. To mention
a few, it allows to study the composition of aggregate unemployment at the level of the
firm; it sheds light on the effect of localized shocks and targeted policies; and it exploits the
granularity and inter-firm structure captured in employer-employee matched records. By
analyzing the steady-state equilibrium, we obtain analytic solutions that inform us about
local unemployment, local flows, firm sizes, profits and firm hiring behavior. In addition,
this framework provides new micro foundations of stylized facts such as the Beveridge curve
and the employer-size premium.
Network theory has been extensively used to study labor markets in the context of
information transmission through social networks. The pioneering work of Granovetter
(1973) showed the importance that infrequently-used personal contacts have in acquiring
non-redundant information about vacancies. Although Granovetter’s hypothesis has been
challenged by studies that use comprehensive social media micro-data (Gee et al., 2014a,b),
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the importance of social networks in diffusing job information is not in question. Other
studies about the role of social networks in labor markets look at migration (Munshi, 2003),
urban and rural unemployment (Wahba and Zenou, 2005), investment in personal contacts
(Galeotti and Merlino, 2014), local earnings (Schmutte, 2010), board interlock networks
(Kitti et al., 2017), and causality between social connections and hiring decisions (Eliason
et al., 2012) among other topics. There is also a substantial number of theoretical models
about social networks in labor markets and their formation; pioneered by Boorman (1975)
and Montgomery (1991). Some them focus on labor outcomes as a result of the structure
of social networks (Calvo´-Armengol and Jackson, 2004; Calvo´-Armengol and Zenou, 2005;
Calvo´-Armengol and Jackson, 2007; Schmutte, 2010; Galenianos, 2014). Other works an-
alyze inequality and segregation effects in the job market (Calvo´-Armengol and Jackson,
2004; Tassier and Menczer, 2008). For a comprehensive review of this literature, we refer to
a review elaborated by Ioannides and Loury (2004).
Despite the wide application of network methods to study labor markets, most of this
work was only focused on the role of social networks in communicating information about
vacancies. These studies have important applications in long-term policies such as affirma-
tive action law, but are not so useful for short-term policies such as contingency plans in the
presence of shocks. Furthermore, the role of the firm in these models becomes trivial if not
absent, which is problematic for policies that aim at incentivizing firms. In fact, little has
been done to study labor mobility on networks. To the best of our knowledge, there are only
a few studies that analyze labor flows through networks. The idea of national-level highly
desegregated LFNs was first introduced by Guerrero and Axtell (2013) to study firm-to-firm
labor flows. For this, the authors use employee-employer matched records from the universe
of workers in Finland and a sample from Mexico. They characterize the topology of these
LFNs and find that network connectivity is highly correlated with employment growth at the
firm level. Using US micro-data, Schmutte (2014) constructs job-to-job networks in order to
identify four job clusters. Mobility between these clusters is highly frictional and dependent
on the business cycle. Both studies find that any clusters identified through community
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detection methods have little correspondence to standard categorizations such as industrial
classification, geographical regions, or occupational groups. The LFN framework provides
an alternative way to analyze labor dynamics, while contributing to the use of methods
from network science in economics. A closer (and growing) type of literature comes from
the studies that use LFNs for different questions related to labor mobility. For example
Guerrero and Lo´pez (2016) build a theoretical computational model to study the effect of
the LFN topology on unemployment in the presence of shocks. Lo´pez et al. (2015) use the
method of random walks on graph to estimate the firm size distribution from information on
labor firm-to-firm flows. Mondani (2017) studies the evolution of LFNs in Stockholm. Tong
et al. (2017) generalize LFNs to multi-layered graphs. More recently, Park et al. (2019)
have studied the global LFN through Linked-In data of 500 million individuals in order to
characterize geo-industrial clusters. From this burgeoning literature, it is clear that the idea
and usage of LFNs, as an alternative to the AMF, has become standard. However, we still
lack models that integrate LFNs with micro-economic theory. Hence, our work advances
this this front by providing the first model of such type.
Overall, our work complements five strands of literature. First it adds to the family of
search and matching models in labor economics by introducing the method of random walks
on graphs as a tool to analyze labor mobility and aggregate unemployment. It also pushes
the boundaries on how employer-employee matched micro-datasets are used today. Second,
it contributes to the field of networks in labor markets by expanding the application of
network methods beyond the scope of personal contacts, since social networks are difficult
to observe on a large-scale2. Since LFNs partially capture labor flows induced by personal
contacts (people who worked together may recommend each other in the future), they serve
as an additional source of information to study the effect of social networks in the labor
market. Third, it complements the literature on micro-foundations of the AMF (Butters,
1977; Hall, 1979; Pissarides, 1979; Montgomery, 1991; Lang, 1991; Blanchard and Diamond,
1994; Coles, 1994; Coles and Smith, 1998; Stevens, 2007; Naidu, 2007). Because frictions
2Although online social networks provide a rich source of information, they are highly susceptible to
biases and multiple factors that incentivize individuals to opt out of this form of communication.
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are captured in the form of a network, there is no need to assume an aggregate matching
process. Fourth, it strengthens the growing literature of inter-firm networks (Saito et al.,
2007; Konno, 2009; Atalay et al., 2011; Acemoglu et al., 2012; di Giovanni et al., 2014). By
avoiding aggregation into arbitrary submarkets, the LFN approach allows studying firm and
labor dynamics jointly. Fifth, it contributes to the study of local labor markets by providing
a new way of defining localities at the level of the firm, which should facilitate the study of
local shocks and their propagation.
This paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 presents the model in two parts.
First, we introduce the problem of the firm, which maximizes profits in the steady-state when
wages are exogenous. Then, we characterize the job search process as a random walk on a
graph, which helps us solving the firm’s problem of choosing the optimal number of vacancies.
In section 3 we endogenize wages and find that the hiring behavior of the firm correlates
with the one of its neighbors. Under an inelastic labor supply, this behavioral correlation
becomes systemic, making aggregate unemployment sensitive to the network topology. We
illustrate this with hypothetical networks and by performing a counter-factual analysis with
empirical data. Finally, in section 4 we discuss the results, their policy implications and
potential of this framework for future research.
2 Model with an exogenous wage
The aim of our model is to understand the link between the topology of an exogenous LFN
and aggregate unemployment. The model considers an economy in a steady state where
firms demand a constant amount of labor and workers search for jobs randomly. Since we
are interested in understanding the effect of the network topology on unemployment, we
focus on firm behavior and model workers as random walkers. In this section, we assume a
single exogenous wage, and in section 3 we introduce an exogenous supply to generate wage
dispersion.
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2.1 Firms
There are {1, ..., N} firms in the economy. In the steady state, each firm has size Li. Every
period, a fraction of the i’s employees becomes separated with an exogenous probability
λ. By hiring job applicants, the firm compensates the loss of employees. Profits are made
exclusively from labor rents. Therefore, firms maximize profits by determining the optimal
number of vacancies to open every period. However, opening vacancies also depends on
exogenous shocks in the form of investments. These investments enable firms to open
vacancies and they arrive with a probability v. Therefore, when a firm has vacancies we say
that it is open, and closed otherwise. The expected steady-state firm size is
(1− λ)Li + vhiAi,
where Ai is the number of job applicants and hi is the fraction of applicants hired by the
firm.
Unfilled vacancies are destroyed every period, so we use hi as a continuous approximation
for vacancies in a firm. The intuition is that the firm has an expectation about the number
of applicants that it would receive in the steady state; for example, by counting the CVs that
job seekers drop at its offices everyday. Hence Ai is the expected number of applicants. The
firm opens at most Ai positions in order to minimize the cost of unfilled vacancies (of course
there still can be unfilled vacancies if the number of applicants is lower than expected).
Therefore, the number of vacancies opened by the firm can be written as a fraction of Ai.
We assume independence between workers, so we can treat hi as a probability. We call it
the hiring policy, and it represents the likelihood that a job seeker who applies to firm i
becomes hired.
Building on Barron et al. (1987), we assume that the objective of the firm is to maximize
profits by setting an optimal hiring policy. For this, the firm also takes into account its
linear technology with a productivity factor y, the exogenous wage w, and cost parameters
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c ∈ (0, 1) and κ ∈ [0, 1]. Then, the profit maximization problem is given by
max
hi
Πi = (1− λ)(y − w)Li + v(y − w)hiAi − vcLihi − (1− v)κcLihi. (1)
On the one hand, c captures the cost of opening more vacancies. We assume that this
cost scales with firm size (e.g., because larger firms invest more in screening processes and
HR in general), as suggested by recent empirical evidence (Muehlemann and Pfeifer, 2016).
On the other hand, κ represents a sunk cost from HR which the firm incurs when it is closed
(e.g., setup expenses for screening future applications). Parameters c and h also affect the
sunk cost since the setup cost of HR is assumed to be proportional to the expected number
of new hires or vacancies.
In order to generate concavity in eq. (1), we assume that the firm understands the job
search process for a given set of hiring rates of its neighbors. That is, the firm does not know
how other companies arrive to their hiring rates, it only knows the rates of its immediate
neighbors and how they determine –among other quantities to be discussed below– the
expected number of incoming job applications.3 Therefore, we proceed to characterize job
search and obtain the steady-state solutions for Li and Ai, which the firm takes into account
in order to maximize profits.
2.2 Job search
Let us consider a network where each node represents a firm and the absence of an edge
between two firms means that labor market frictions between them are so high that we would
not expect any labor flows between them in the short run. This network is represented by the
adjacency matrix A, where Aij = Aji = 1 if firms i and j share and edge, and Aij = Aji = 0
otherwise. Workers flow through this network as they gain and lose employment from its
3This is consistent with the idea of firms having a limited ability to understand the complexity of the
system in which they are embedded.(Simon, 1979)
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nodes, hence the name of labor flow network (LFN). The LFN is unweighted because edges
represent a categorical aspect of the labor market: whether we should expect labor flows
between two firms or not. It is undirected because the edges capture some ‘affinity’ between
firms such that frictions are low in both directions. For simplicity, we do not allow self-loops,
so the diagonal entries of A are all zero. We assume that the LFN has a single component.
However, the results are generalizable for networks with multiple components. Firm i has
ki =
∑
j Aij , also known as the degree of i. The set Γi contains all firms j such that
Aij = 1.
Workers can be in one of two states: employed or unemployed. Regardless of his or her
state, each worker is always associated with a firm. Therefore, jobless workers are associated
to their last employers. Each worker employed by firm i might become unemployed with
probability λ. If unemployed, he or she looks at the set γi ⊆ Γi of i’s neighbor firms that
received investments. Hence, we say that γi is the set of open neighbors of i and it may
change from one period to another. If |γi| = 0, the job seeker remains unemployed for
the rest of the period. Otherwise, he or she selects a firm j ∈ γi at random with uniform
probability and submits a job application. For simplicity, we assume that each job seeker
can submit at most one application per period. It is possible to return to i as long as
the last job was held at j such that Aij = 1. Finally, if the job application is successful
(with probability hj), the job seeker becomes employed at j, updating its firm association.
Otherwise, it remains unemployed for the rest of the period. We summarize this process in
the following steps.
1. Each firm receives an investment with probability v.
2. Each employed worker becomes unemployed with probability λ.
3. Each unemployed associated to i (excluding the newly separated ones) picks a firm
j ∈ γi at random and becomes employed with probability hj .
The reader may be concerned about the possibility that a job seeker may occasionally
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search among firms that are not connected to his or her last employer. If the probability of
such event is low, the model preserves the same characteristics because the LFN induces a
dominant effect on job search. When this probability is large, the model becomes an ‘urns-
balls’ model, so the structure of the network is irrelevant. What should be the empirically
relevant magnitude of such probability? Previous work shows that the idea of searching on
a network is empirically compelling since firm-to-firm labor flows tend to be significantly
persistent through time (Lo´pez et al., 2015). Other, unrestricted random matching between
firms and workers is formally rejected when looking at employer-employee matched records
(Guerrero and Lo´pez, 2015). These results suggest that, in a more general model, the
probability of searching ‘outside’ of the network has to be calibrated with a low value.4
2.3 Dynamics
The stochastic process previously described is a random walk on a graph with waiting times
determined by the investment shocks v, the separation rate λ, and the set of hiring policies
{hi}Ni=1. In order to characterize its dynamics, we concentrate on the evolution of the
probability pi(t) that a worker is employed at firm i in period t, and the probability qi(t)
that a worker is unemployed in period t and associated to firm i. For this purpose, let us
first construct the dynamic equations of both probabilities to then obtain the steady-state
solution.
In period t, the probability that a worker is employed at firm i depends on the probability
(1 − λ)pi(t − 1) that he or she was employed at the same firm in the previous period and
did not become separated. In case that the worker was unemployed during t− 1, then pi(t)
also depends on: the probability qj(t− 1) that the worker was associated to a neighbor firm
j; on the probability Pr(γ
(i)
j ) of having a particular configuration γ
(i)
j of open and closed
neighbors of j such that i is open; and on the probability 1/|γ(i)j | that the worker picks i from
4Such a model can be easily constructed, but its solutions do not have an explicit form. In contrast,
focusing exclusively on job search ‘on’ the network yields explicit solutions, which is convenient for building
economic intuition.
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all of j’s open neighbors. Altogether, summing over all possible neighbors and all possible
configurations of open neighbors, and conditioning to the hiring policy, the probability that
a worker is employed by firm i in period t is
pi(t) = (1− λ)pi(t− 1) + hi
∑
j∈Γi
qj(t− 1)
∑
{γ(i)j }
Pr
(
γ
(i)
j
) 1∣∣∣γ(i)j ∣∣∣ , (2)
where {γ(i)j } denotes the set of all possible configurations of open and closed neighbors of j
where i is open.
The probability that a worker is unemployed during t while associated to firm i depends
on the probability λpi(t − 1) of becoming separated from i in the previous period. On the
other hand, if the worker was already unemployed, the probability of remaining in such
state depends on: the probability Pr(γi = ∅) that no neighbor firm of i is open and the
probability 1 − hj of not being hired by the chosen open neighbor j. Accounting for all
possible non-empty sets γi of open neighbors, the probability of being unemployed in t and
associated to firm i is given by
qi(t) = λpi(t− 1) + qi(t− 1)
∑
γi 6=∅
Pr(γi)
1
|γi|
∑
j∈γi
(1− hj) + Pr(γi = ∅)
 . (3)
Up to this point, the model might seem complicated due to all the parameters involved.
However, our intention is to provide a general framework that allows the user to control
for different degrees of freedom. As we will show ahead, the steady-state solutions take
very simple and intuitive forms, while several parameters can be disregarded if no data is
available to measure them. Generally speaking, the qualitative nature of our results holds
for different calibrations.
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2.4 Steady state
In the steady-state, pi(t) = pi(t − 1) = pi and qi(t) = qi(t − 1) = qi for every firm i. The
following results follow from solving eqs. (2) and (3).
Proposition 1. The process specified in section 2.2 has a unique steady-state where proba-
bilities pi and qi are time-invariant for every firm i.
Existence follows from a standard result in random walks on graphs (Bolloba´s, 1998)
(see appendix). Uniqueness comes from condition
1 =
N∑
i=1
pi +
N∑
i=1
qi,
which indicates that all probabilities should add up to one, implying that every worker is
either employed or unemployed, and associated to only one firm. This result implies that
a unique steady-state is always reached regardless of how the hiring policies in {hi}Ni=1
are assigned to each firm in the LFN. Lo´pez et al. (2015) provide more general results for
heterogeneous separation rates and heterogeneous investment shocks. However, this version
is more suitable for economic modeling because it yields explicit solutions with intuitive
economic meaning.
Proposition 2. The steady-state average size of a firm i that follows eqs. (2) and (3) is
Li =
ϕ
λ
hih¯Γiki, (4)
where h¯Γi =
1
ki
∑
j Aijhj is the average hiring policy of i’s neighbor firms and ϕ is a
normalizing constant.
For now, let us defer the explanation of ϕ for a few paragraphs. Equation (4) suggests
that, ceteris paribus, the size of a firm increases with its degree. As expected, firms can
increase their own sizes through larger hiring policies. Equation (4) captures an externality:
a firm’s hiring policy affects the size of its neighbor firms. This result follows from an
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intuitive mechanism. If firm i hires more people from its pool of applicants, it increases its
own size. In consequence, more people will become separated from i through the exogenous
separation process governed by λ (which also reduces the size of the firm). More unemployed
individuals associated to i translates into a larger pool of job seekers that will potentially
apply for a job at i’s neighbor j. Therefore, if everything else is constant, Aj increases,
contributing to j’s growth. This mechanism becomes evident in the following result.
Proposition 3. The steady-state average number of applications received by a firm i that
follows eqs. (2) and (3) is
Ai = ϕh¯Γiki. (5)
The proof follows from the fact that, in the steady-state, the number of separated em-
ployees λLi must equal the number of newly hired ones hiAi in order for Li to remain
constant through time (see appendix).
2.5 Hiring policy and profits
We assume that firms understand the job search process to a fair extent. That is, they use
eqs. (4) and (5) in eq. (1) and take ϕ and h¯Γi as given. Then, substituting eqs. (4) and (5)
in eq. (1), and solving the F.O.C. yields the optimal hiring policy
h∗ =
ψ
2φ
(y − w), (6)
where ψ = (1− λ+ vλ) and φ = c(v + κ− vκ). We have removed sub-index i because the
optimal hiring policy is independent of ki. This result is quite intuitive in a neoclassical
sense, since higher wages are compensated with lower hiring policies. It also suggests that,
with a unique exogenous wage, all firms set the same optimal hiring policy. This means
that we can rewrite some of these results exclusively as functions of ki. More specifically,
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we rewrite the firm size as
Li = ϕh
∗2ki, (7)
and the profit as
Π∗i =
ϕψ3
8λφ2
(y − w)3ki. (8)
2.6 Aggregation of unemployment
Solving eqs. (2) and (3) yields the average number of unemployed individuals associated to
firm i in the steady-state. This is a bottom-up construction that takes into account how
unemployment is distributed across firms, so we term it firm-specific unemployment. This
new measure provides information about the employment prospects of a firms’ ex-employees
and a method to identify pools of local unemployment. Firm-specific unemployment is
obtained from the following result.
Proposition 4. The steady-state average unemployment associated to a firm i that follows
eqs. (2) and (3) is
Ui =
ϕhiki
1− (1− v)ki . (9)
The normalizing constant ϕ captures the population conservation condition H =
∑
i Li+∑
i Ui, so it takes the form
ϕ =
H∑
i hih¯Γiki
[
1
λ +
1
h¯Γi [1−(1−v)ki ]
] . (10)
Equation (9) becomes more intuitive when multiplying by
λh¯Γi
λh¯Γi
, in which case we obtain
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Ui =
λLi
h¯Γi [1− (1− v)ki ]
. (11)
Note that h¯Γi [1− (1− v)ki ] is the transition probability from unemployment to employ-
ment for a worker associated to firm i. The reciprocal of this probability is the average
duration t¯ui of an unemployment spell for an individual whose last job was in i. Therefore,
we can rewrite eq. (9) as
Ui = λt¯
u
i Li (12)
In general, firm-specific unemployment is an interesting measure because it not only pro-
vides a highly granular unit of the composition of aggregate unemployment, but also yields
information about how good will be the employment prospects of someone working at a
particular company.
Due to the independence between degree and hiring policy implied by eq. (6), aggrega-
tion of unemployment is straightforward, given that the firm-specific unemployment rate is
defined as
ui =
Ui
Ui + Li
=
λ
λ+ h∗[1− (1− v)ki ] , (13)
which is non-increasing and convex in ki. Note that for a LFN where all firms have the
same degree, eq. (13) is equivalent to the Beveridge curve obtained in ‘urn-balls’ models.
Let the LFNs of two economies be represented by their adjacency matrices A and
A′, with corresponding degree distributions P and P ′, and aggregate unemployment rates
u =
∑kmax
k=1 ukP (k) and u
′ =
∑kmax
k=1 ukP
′(k). Then, the next results follow from network
stochastic dominance (Jackson and Rogers, 2007a,b; Lo´pez-Pintado, 2008).
Proposition 5. If P strictly first-order stochastically dominates P ′, then u < u′.
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Proposition 5 is quite intuitive since the average firm connectivity of A is higher than in
A′. An LFN with higher connectivity reflects an economy with lower labor market frictions.
Under these conditions, job seekers have better chances of finding open firms and new job
opportunities.
Proposition 6. If P ′ is a strict mean-preserving spread of P , then u < u′.
Proofs of propositions 5 and 6 follow from direct differentiation of eq. (13), which shows
that u is non-increasing and convex in ki. Proposition 6 means that higher degree hetero-
geneity translates into more unemployment. Heterogeneity in a LFN reflects the ‘roughness’
of the search landscape. It is analogous to heterogeneity in search and matching models.
However, there is the fundamental difference: agents traverse the economy by gradually
navigating the LFN, instead of being randomly allocated to any firm. As we will learn
ahead, this subtle difference in the reallocation process significantly affects aggregate un-
employment when the hiring policies are heterogeneous. We will show that the LFN not
only has an ordinal effect on aggregate unemployment, but also a significant impact on its
overall level.
3 Endogenous wages
Having established that the topology of the LFN affects aggregate unemployment, a natural
follow-up question is how this effect works when wages are endogenous. To illustrate this
idea, consider the externality through which the hiring rate of a company affects the flows of
another. When wages are endogenous, this externality triggers a reaction of the neighbors
by updating their hiring policies according to the new expected number of applications
(because wages change the costs of sustaining a specific h). This, in turn, determines not
only firm sizes, but also firm-specific unemployment. Thus, we are interested in studying
the set of heterogeneous equilibrium hiring policies {h∗i }. For this purpose, we endogenize
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wages by introducing an aggregate labor supply5. Equilibrium wages are formed when the
individual labor demand of each firm meet the supply, generating a dispersion that depends
on the network topology.
For analytic tractability, we adopt a labor supply with a functional form that guarantees
a wage bounded by (0, 1). However, any other monotonically increasing function can be
used, as long as the necessary considerations are made in order to guarantee wages and
hiring policies with consistent bounds. The inverse labor supply has the form
wi =
a`i
b+ `i
, (14)
where `i is the individual demand of firm i; b > 0 is a parameter that affects the price
elasticity; and a provides the upper bound of the wage. We assume a = y for analytical
convenience, guaranteeing non-negative rents from labor.
The labor demand of firm i is equivalent to the number of new hires. Firms are wage tak-
ers, so their profit-maximization problem remains unchanged. Therefore the labor demand
of firm i takes the form
`i = h
∗
iAi. (15)
Substituting eq. (15) in eq. (14) and using identity eq. (5) and then eq. (4) yields the
equilibrium wage
w∗i =
yϕh∗i h¯
∗
Γi
ki
b+ ϕh∗i h¯
∗
Γi
ki
=
yλLi
b+ λLi
, (16)
which explicitly shows that larger firms pay higher wages. In other words this result captures
5The reader may be inclined for an alternative wage-generating mechanism like Nash bargaining. Al-
though this might be theoretically appealing it would require specifying the worker’s behavior and intro-
ducing more parameters, in which case, the model becomes intractable. For the purpose of presenting the
idea of firms’ correlated behaviors through the LFN, it is enough to account for an aggregate supply.
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the well-known employer size premium (Brown and Medoff, 1989; Brown et al., 1990). It
also suggests that firms with higher degree pay higher salaries when compared to other firms
with the same hi and h¯Γi .
Substituting eq. (16) in eq. (6) yields i’s equilibrium hiring policy
h∗i = min
1, φb−
√
φ2b2 + φψϕ2byh¯∗Γiki
−2φϕh¯∗Γiki
 , (17)
where the firm sets either a fraction h∗i ≥ 0 or a corner solution where it hires all applicants.
Note that eq. (17) in its vector form is a continuous map T : [0, 1]N → [0, 1]N . Therefore, a
set {h∗i }Ni=1 exists.
Equation (17) captures the interaction between the hiring behavior of firm i (expressed
through hi) and the hiring behavior of its neighbors, correlating hiring policies across the
LFN in a negative fashion. This has important implications for the reallocation of labor.
For example, if a worker leaves a firm with a low hiring policy, his or her employment
prospects will be limited to companies with a similar hiring rate. Therefore, escaping this
cluster of poor employment prospects takes longer than in a matching process where hiring
policies are well-mixed across firms. This has a profound implication on our understanding
of local shocks and unemployment traps because the former exacerbate these bottleneck
effects, generating unemployment traps. For instance, we know by eq. (4) that a higher ki
induces a larger firm size. Then, the negative correlation between ki and hi means that a
larger proportion of workers (those in the largest firms) are searching for jobs in firms with
lower hiring policies (their neighbors). Following this logic, we can expect that an LFN with
a degree distribution that is a mean-preserving spread of another one induces a higher level
of unemployment.
There is an important connection between the topology of the LFN and the optimal
hiring policies. Its importance relies on the degree of heterogeneity of the set {h∗i }Ni=1. If
there is a large spread of hiring policies, then the effect of the network topology on aggregate
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unemployment is larger. In this model, the diversity of hiring policies comes from the
supply elasticity, since it is the main determinant of wage dispersion6. Figure 1 illustrates
the relationship between supply elasticity, wages, and hiring policies. To build intuition,
consider the firm with the largest labor demand `max, which determines the maximum wage
in the economy. Considering everything else constant, the latter is higher in an economy
with a more inelastic labor supply. A higher wage implies a lower hiring policy for this firm,
increasing the dispersion between the maximum hiring policy hmax and the lowest one hmin.
Firms with different degrees set different hiring policies (assuming that h¯Γi does not cancel
the effect of ki). Therefore, heterogeneity in both, wages and the topology of the LFN, are
important, so this modeling framework seems adequate and points to important network
effects that have not been previously studied.
Figure 1: Wage dispersion and hiring policies
The left panel shows two aggregate labor supplies with different elasticities obtained from eq. (14). It also
presents the corresponding wages that the firm with the largest demand `max would have to pay when
confronting the supply. The right panel maps these wages through eq. (6), into the hiring policies that
would be set by the firm with the largest demand.
In order to better understand the aggregation of unemployment, it is important to an-
6However, the model is flexible enough to allow firm heterogeneity in parameters such as the separation
rate λ, the productivity y, the hiring cost c, and the sunk cost κ. This is an important strength of the model
because it facilitates more realistic calibrations that consider the cross-sectional variation of firms.
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alyze how the correlation of hiring policies interact with the topology of the LFN. For this
purpose, we study three representative cases of well-known network topologies and then
proceed to apply our model to a topology obtained from empirical data.
3.1 Stylized networks
We are interested in learning how big are the effects of the LFN topology on aggregate
unemployment when hiring policies correlate according to eq. (17). For this purpose, we
analyse the outcome of the model under three random networks that relate to homogeneous
and heterogeneous job search processes. The first is a regular graph, i.e. a network where
every firm has the same number of connections. The second is the popular Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
graph, where the firm degree follows a binomial distribution. The third is the so-called
scale-free network, which has Pareto-distributed degrees. Naturally, there are other elements
that define the topology of a real-world network (e.g., clusters, path length, closeness, etc.).
Here, we focus on the degree to build an initial intuition, while we concentrate on empirical
LFNs in the section 3.2.
Each of these stylized networks is differentiated by its degree heterogeneity. To study
the effect induced by such difference, we have chosen topologies with the same average
degree k¯, i.e. with a Dirac delta distribution. Therefore, an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi degree distribution
is a mean-preserving spread of the regular graph, while the scale-free is a mean-preserving
spread of the other two. In addition, processes that take place on the regular and the Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi graphs can be well-approximated by aggregations because the degree heterogeneity
is negligible. This is not the case in for the scale-free network, so it is important that we
study the differences produced by these three topologies. For the case of the regular graph,
it is easy to obtain a closed form solution of eq. (17) by substituting h¯∗Γi by h
∗ in eq. (17)
and using eq. (10). This yields
h∗ =
bN(yψθ − 2λφ) +√b2N2(2λφ+ yψθ)2 + 8byNHλ2φψθ
4φθ(bN +Hλ)
, (18)
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where θ = 1 − (1 − v)k. For the case of the networks with heterogeneous degrees, the
solutions are obtained numerically. A formal proof of the uniqueness of the fixed point in
eq. (17) is not straightforward. However, numerical experiments via Monte Carlo simulation
suggest that eq. (17) is a contraction mapping, providing a consistent solution that we use
to compute aggregate unemployment.
Panel A in fig. 2 shows the Beveridge curves generated by the model. Here, we portray
the Beveridge curve as the relationship between the unemployment rate and the average
hiring policy. The curves are generated by solving the model for different levels of the
hiring cost c in the interval [0.1, 0.9]. There are two notable features that stand out in this
diagram. First, the curve from the scale-free network is significantly distant from the other
two. Second, the three curves collapse when h¯∗ = 1. This is quite intuitive when we consider
the sampling process that workers undergo in the LFN. If all firms set hiring policies near
1, the likelihood of getting a job depends mostly on the investment shocks, which happen
uniformly across firms. In this situation, a job seeker at a firm with fewer edges has almost
the same chance of finding a job as a worker at a firm with many connections. This also
relates to the dispersion of {h∗i }Ni=1 because, when firms hire all applicants, there is no
diversity of hiring policies, so the LFN effect vanishes.
Panel B in fig. 2 shows the employer-size premium across the three networks. It is clear
that the network with largest degree heterogeneity also has the largest wage dispersion. The
topology of the network does not shift the L−w curve so we cannot expect significant changes
in the average wage due to network structure. Panel C demonstrates the interaction between
firms’ hiring behavior and their neighbors’. As suggested in eq. (17), there is a negative
relationship between h∗i and h¯
∗
Γi
. These correlations are clustered by levels of h∗i and their
dispersion is larger in the scale-free network.
As shown in panel D of fig. 2, firms with more edges tend to set lower hiring policies.
The mechanism is straightforward: with more neighbors, Ai grows and so does i’s demand
for labor. More demand implies a higher wage to be paid by the firm, which shifts its profit
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curve to the left. In order to compensate for higher salaries, the firm needs to re-adjust h∗i
to a lower level. Finally, as predicted by eqs. (4) and (9), firms with higher connectivity tend
to be larger and have more associated unemployed individuals. In addition, the network
with a Pareto degree distribution also exhibits a larger firm size dispersion.
These results demonstrate that the level and distribution of unemployment are highly
sensitive to topologies with significant heterogeneity. This is so because firms’ behaviors
correlate due to the gradual and restricted movement of labour throughout the economy.
Sensitivity to network topology highlights the importance of considering the structure of
the labour market frictions, i.e. an empirical LFN. In order to provide an illustration of
how these insights could be used empirically, we calibrate the model to a micro-data set and
show different counterfactuals on aggregate unemployment that would result from removing
the heterogeneous structure of the empirical LFN of Finland.
3.2 Application
We would like to conclude by analyzing real-world LFNs and learning something about the
empirical implications of their topologies. So far, most empirical work looking at labor
flows is on aggregate datasets (e.g., industries and regions). In contrast, our application
exploits firm-level data and demonstrates the importance of understanding the effects of the
network topology on aggregate unemployment; something that could be extremely useful
for employment policy.
3.2.1 Data and LFN
We use the Finnish Longitudinal Employer-Employee Data (FLEED), which consists of an
annual panel of employer-employee matched records of the universe of firms and employees
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in Finland. The panel was constructed by Statistics Finland from social security registries
by recording the association between each worker and each firm (enterprise codes, not es-
tablishments), at the end of each calendar year. If a worker is not employed, it is not part
of the corresponding cross-section. The result is a panel of 20 years that tracks every firm
and every employed individual at the end of each year (approximately 2 × 105 firms and
2× 106 workers).
In previous studies, we have constructed LFNs by performing different statistical tests
about the significance of flows between firms (Guerrero and Lo´pez, 2015; Lo´pez et al.,
2015), for example, threshold methods and configuration models. Overall, these exercises
have shown systematic empirical regularities across different levels of temporal aggregations
(e.g., a Pareto degree distribution). For this reason (and because this is an illustrative
application), here we take a simpler approach. For a given year, we construct an edge
between two firms if we observe labor flows between them.
3.2.2 Calibration
Then, we calibrate the model to match the observed aggregate unemployment rates of
Finland throughout 20 years, while controlling for its LFNs and separation rates. In order
to estimate λ, we make use of one last theoretical result
Proposition 7. The steady-state average number of unemployed who become employed after
being associated to a firm i that follows eqs. (2) and (3) is
Oi = ϕhih¯Γiki. (19)
The proof follows from the fact that, in the steady-state, Oi = λLi (see appendix). The
intuition is simple: we can consider firm-specific unemployment as a pool of people that is
constant through time. The inflows into Ui are λLi while the outflows are Oi. In order for
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Ui to be constant, the inflows and the outflows must be equal.
Taking advantage of eq. (19), we use the steady-state condition Oi = λLi in order to
estimate the model
Oi = βλLi + i, (20)
where βλ = λ. We calibrate the model to a daily frequency, so the estimated separation
rate becomes βˆdλ = 1− (1− βˆλ)
1
365 (see appendix).
During the calibration process, we want to avoid trivial solutions such as homogeneous
sets of hiring policies. This is so because homogeneity misses important empirical regulari-
ties, for example, wage dispersion, heterogeneous firm sizes, and the employer-size premium.
We use parameters c, κ, and b for this purpose. As previously discussed, b allows wage dis-
persion, so an inelastic labor supply is desirable in order to generate heterogeneous hiring
policies. Parameter c determines the overall level of wi and, hence, of h
∗
i . Finally, κ limits
the maximum wi by making the firm more sensitive to the investment shocks, even when it
is closed. We normalize y = 1 and allow v to be a degree of freedom to calibrate the model
and match the observed level of aggregate unemployment.
Once calibrated, we use the model to compute a counter-factual. This consists of evalu-
ating the model under a different network structure, while keeping everything else constant.
Put it differently, we estimate what would be the aggregate unemployment rate in Finland if
the frictions of the labor market would have a homogeneous structure (an implicit assump-
tion in aggregate job search models). In other words, we compute aggregate unemployment
when ki = k, which is given by eq. (13), where h
∗ corresponds to the solution of the homo-
geneous case in eq. (18). We perform this exercise for different supply elasticities in order
to gain some insights about the minimum and maximum effects of the network topology.
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3.2.3 Results
Figure 3 shows the difference in aggregate unemployment between the fitted model and
the counter-factual. We present results for three levels of supply elasticity7. As previously
discussed, a more inelastic labor supply generates more wage dispersion, which contributes
to a larger difference in unemployment between the real LFN and the regular network. We
interpret this difference as the contribution of the network structure to aggregate unem-
ployment. Under a very elastic labor supply, the contribution is marginal. However, if the
supply is highly inelastic, the contribution of the network topology can account for more
than 90% of the unemployment rate. Given that real economies exhibit wage dispersion,
the LFN is likely to have a significant effect on aggregate unemployment.
Naturally, any aggregate model (implying a regular network) could also be calibrated to
match the empirical level of unemployment. Thus, the counter-factual of a heterogeneous
network structure would yield a higher unemployment rate. The important point in this
exercise is that, if one would like to predict unemployment after a change in parameters, it
is likely that the aggregate model will underestimate the change in unemployment because
the underlying homogeneous structure is less sensitive. Furthermore, the heterogeneous
structure of the LFN is observed from empirical microdata on how labor is actually re-
allocated, something omitted when aggregating the matching process. Therefore, further
investigations in the direction of job search on networks would be desirable in order to better
understand labor dynamics and the limitations of aggregate approaches.
Finally, the LFN topology not only affects the level of aggregate unemployment, but
also its variation through time. In this exercise, it is evident that degree heterogeneity
also increases the magnitude of annual variations of the unemployment rate. This is an
7The bump in the counter-factual of 1997 is caused by an anomaly in the data. Due to changes in data
administration, 1997 registers a substantial increase in N . Most of these firms have ki = 1, so the average
degree drops nearly 50% with respect to 1996.
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important result considering that the origins of unemployment volatility is a highly debated
topic (Mortensen and Nagypa´l, 2007; Pissarides, 2009; Shimer, 2010; Obstbaum, 2011). If
structural changes or shocks take place (e.g., changes in λ or v), the labor reallocation process
is smoother on a regular structure than on a heterogeneous one. This is quite intuitive
when thinking in terms of job search as a gradual navigation on a network. A shock or a
structural change generates heterogeneous adjustments of hiring policies when the network
is not regular (and assuming wage dispersion). If the LFN has firms that concentrate
many connections, labor reallocation becomes susceptible to the congestion effects that
these companies generate by re-adjusting their hiring policies. In a regular topology the
reallocation process is smoother because the shock or structural change generates the same
re-adjustment across all firms, which happens to have the same number of employees and
associated unemployed. Therefore, the LFN points towards the need to understand the
propagation of shocks and structural changes through the gradual reallocation of labor that
takes place on the network, something that we leave for future work. On a final note, since
the reader might be interested in more realistic specifications (e.g. a mixed model with
random jumps and multiple choices), we also encourage research into agent-based models,
which are far more suitable tools to deal with the complexity of labor markets.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium outcomes on different network topologies
Equilibrium solutions for an example calibration: {N = 200, H = 4000, λ = .05, y = 1, v = .8, c = .1,
κ = .5, b = 1 }, and different network topologies with the same average degree of 6. The solution for the
network with a Dirac delta degree distribution was obtained through eq. (18), while the ones for the binomial
and Pareto degree distributions were obtained numerically. Panel a shows the solutions for different levels
of c. The rest of the panels show the cross-sectional variation of the solution for representative networks.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium unemployment and counterfactuals
The diamonds correspond to the observed annual aggregate unemployment rate. The grey line was obtained
by calibrating the model to match the observed unemployment rates of each year using parameter values:
y = 1, c = .1, κ = .5, and H = 2, 000, 000 (the size of the Finnish labor force). N is the number of firms in
the data, λ was estimated from the data, and v varies between years due to the fitting procedure.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a theory to study aggregate unemployment from new network-
theoretic micro-foundations of job search as a gradual navigation process. The framework
allows to study the composition of aggregate unemployment with a resolution at the level
of each firm. It also shows that an externality emerges between neighbor firms: my growth
affects yours. We find that, when labor is reallocated through heterogeneous networks,
hiring policies correlate negatively between neighboring firms. For a large network, this
becomes systemic, generating wage dispersion in presence of an inelastic labor supply. This
dispersion, in turn, causes the level and composition of aggregate unemployment to be
dependent on the topology of the LFN. If such topology exhibits high levels of heterogeneity
(e.g., a Pareto degree distribution), not only the distribution of firm-specific unemployment
is skewed, but the level of aggregate unemployment is significantly higher than expected in
a model that neglects the network structure of frictions. This framework provides a rich yet
parsimonious description of decentralized labor markets with the possibility of preserving
important information that is lost through aggregate approaches.
The LFN framework can be employed to consider firm-specific phenomena. In addition,
this framework is particularly well suited to study the propagation of local shocks and
structural changes, a major issue in labor policy discussions. Its localized nature allows it
to be implemented through other methods such as computer simulation and agent-based
models (Freeman, 1998; Geanakoplos et al., 2012) in order to study the impact and timing
effects of specific policies. This facilitates the study of a richer set of dynamical problems
that are difficult to address from an aggregate perspective. For example, we could use
employer-employee matched records to calibrate an agent-based model with the real LFN
and then simulate local shocks to groups of firms. The computational model would allow
obtaining information about how labor would flow out of the affected parts of the economy
and, gradually, find its way to firms with better employment prospects. Characterizing this
gradual navigation process would be extremely helpful in designing policies that aim not
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only at alleviating unemployment, but at smoothing transitional phases of the economy.
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A Proof of proposition 1
Let pi(t) and qi(t) be the probabilities of being employed and unemployed at firm i in period
t respectively. Both quantities are dynamically described by
pi(t) = (1− λ)pi(t− 1) + hi
∑
j∈Γi
qj(t− 1)
∑
{γ(i)j }
Pr
(
γ
(i)
j
) 1∣∣∣γ(i)j ∣∣∣ , (21)
and
qi(t) = λpi(t− 1) + qi(t− 1)
∑
γ 6=∅
Pr(γi)
1
|γi|
∑
j∈γi
(1− hj) + Pr(γi = ∅) + (1− s)
 , (22)
where γ
(i)
j indicates a configuration of open and closed neighbors of j, such that i is open.
The symbol {γ(i)j } denotes the set of all possible configurations of open and closed neighbors
of j where i is open. The set γi contains all open neighbors of i, and we denote ∅ the set of
neighbors of i when all of them are closed.
In the steady-state, pi(t) = pi(t − t) = pi and qi(t) = qi(t − t) = qi. Note that∑
γ 6=∅ Pr(γi) + Pr(γi = ∅) = 1, so the system defined by eqs. (21) and (22) becomes
0 = −λpi + hi
∑
j∈Γi
qj
∑
{γ(i)j }
Pr
(
γ
(i)
j
) 1∣∣∣γ(i)j ∣∣∣ (23)
0 = λpi − qi
∑
γ 6=∅
Pr(γi)h¯Γi . (24)
where h¯Γi =
1
ki
∑
j Aijhj is the average hiring policy of i’s neighbor firms and ϕ is a
normalizing constant.
From eq. (24), let us write qi in terms of pi as
qi =
λ
s
∑
γ 6=∅ Pr(γi)h¯Γi
pi, (25)
and then substitute pi with eq. (23) to obtain
qi =
∑
j∈Γi
qjhi
∑
{γ(i)j }
Pr
(
γ
(i)
j
)
/
∣∣∣γ(i)j ∣∣∣∑
γ 6=∅ Pr(γi)h¯Γi
, (26)
To understand this further, we write the previous equation in matrix form making use
of the adjacency matrix of the graph, A, for which Aij = Aji = 1 if i and j have an edge
connecting them, and zero otherwise. This produces the expression
N∑
j=1
Aij hi
∑
{γ(i)j }
Pr
(
γ
(i)
j
)
/
∣∣∣γ(i)j ∣∣∣∑
γ 6=∅ Pr(γi)h¯Γi
− δ[i, j]
λpj = 0 (27)
for all i. This represents a homogeneous system of linear equations, which always has the
trivial null solution, and has non-trivial solutions if and only if the matrix contained inside
brackets is singular which, among other things, implies that the matrix does not have full
rank. To show that our model has non-trivial solutions indeed, we define the matrix Λ,
with element Λij corresponding to the expression inside brackets
Λij := Aij
hi
∑
{γ(i)j }
Pr
(
γ
(i)
j
)
/
∣∣∣γ(i)j ∣∣∣∑
γ 6=∅ Pr(γi)h¯Γi
− δ[i, j]. (28)
This matrix does not possess full rank as can be explicitly seen from the fact that all columns
add to zero. To show this, we first sum Λij over i
N∑
i=1
Λij = −1 +
N∑
i=1
Aij
hi
∑
{γ(i)j }
Pr
(
γ
(i)
j
)
/
∣∣∣γ(i)j ∣∣∣∑
γ 6=∅ Pr(γi)h¯Γi
(29)
where −1 comes from −∑i δ[i, j]. We can now show that the numerator and denominator
of the second term are indeed equal. To see this in detail, we organize the elements of {γ(i)j }
by cardinality |γ(i)j |, and rewrite the numerator as
N∑
i=1
Aijhi
∑
{γ(i)j }
Pr(γ
(i)
j )/|γ(i)j | =
|Γj |∑
c=1
1
c
∑
i
Aijhi
∑
|γ(i)j |=c
Pr(γ
(i)
j ), (30)
where the last sum is over all elements of {γ(i)j } with equal size c. Now, the sum over i
guarantees that each neighbor of j belonging to a particular γ
(i)
j is summed, along with the
corresponding hr, where r ∈ γ(i)j . Therefore, the sum over i can be rewritten as
∑
i
Aijhi
∑
|γ(i)j |=c
Pr(γ
(i)
j ) =
∑
|γj |=c
∑
r∈γj
hr
Pr(γj) (31)
and inserting this into the sum over c leads to
|Γj |∑
c=1
1
c
∑
|γj |=c
∑
r∈γj
hr
Pr(γj) = ∑
γj 6=∅
∑
r∈γj hr
|γj | Pr(γj) =
∑
γj 6=∅
〈h〉γjPr(γj) (32)
Therefore,
N∑
i=1
Aijhi
∑
{γ(i)j }
Pr(γ
(i)
j )/|γ(i)j | =
∑
γj 6=∅
〈h〉γjPr(γj) (33)
which means that for all j, eq. (29) is identically zero, guaranteeing that the system has
non-trivial solutions.
Since the matrix for a connected graph has rank N−1, its kernel is one-dimensional, and
thus, to choose a unique solution that belongs to the kernel of Λ we need a single additional
condition. In our case, this condition corresponds to
N∑
i=1
(pi + qi) = 1, (34)
which guarantees that each individual is either employed or unemployed and associated to
only one firm each period. Q.E.D.
B Proof of proposition 2
Let us consider eqs. (23) and (24) and note that the probability Pr(γi) of obtaining a specific
configuration γi of open and closed neighbors follows the binomial v
|γi|(1− v)ki−|γi|. Then,
we obtain that
∑
{γ(i)j }
Pr(γ
(i)
j )/|γ(i)j | →
kj∑
|γ(i)j |=1
(
kj − 1
|γ(i)j | − 1
)
v|γ
(i)
j |(1− v)kj−|γ(i)j |
|γ(i)j |
=
1− (1− v)kj
kj
. (35)
For the sum
∑
γj 6=∅ h¯ΓiPr(γj), we note that each hiring policy hi for i ∈ Γj appears( kj−1
|γj |−1
)
times among all the terms where there are |γj | open neighbors to j. We can then
write
∑
γj 6=∅
h¯ΓiPr(γj)→
kj∑
|γj |=1
(
kj − 1
|γj | − 1
)∑
i∈Γj hi
|γj | v
|γj |(1− v)kj−|γj | = h¯Γi(1− (1− v)kj ), (36)
where h¯Γi :=
∑
i∈Γj hi/kj , i.e., the average hiring policy of the full neighbor set of j.
Therefore, eqs. (23) and (24) simplify into
0 = −λpi + hi
∑
i∈Γi
qj
1− (1− v)kj
kj
(37)
0 = λpi − qih¯Γi [1− (1− v)ki ]. (38)
It is easy to see by inspection that the solution to the system is
pi =
χhih¯Γiki
λ
(39)
qi =
χhiki
1− (1− v)ki (40)
χ =
1∑
i hih¯Γiki
[
1
λ +
1
h¯Γi [1−(1−v)ki ]
] . (41)
Given that the workers’ actions are independent from each other, the evolution of the
firm size follows the binomial
Pr(Li) =
(
H
Li
)
pLii (1− pi)H−Li , (42)
so the steady-state average firm size Li (abusing notation) is
Li = Hpi =
ϕhih¯Γiki
λ
, (43)
where ϕ = Hχ. Q.E.D.
C Proof of proposition 3
Consider the probability ai(t) that a worker submits a job application to firm i in period
t. This depends on: the probability qj(t − 1) of being unemployed in a neighbor j ∈ Γi
during the previous period; on the probability Pr(γ
(i)
j ) of j having a configuration γ
(i)
j of
open of closed neighbors in which i is open; and on the probability of choosing i over all
other alternative neighbors of j. Accounting for all possible events and configurations of
neighbors, this probability is written as
ai(t) =
∑
j∈Γi
qj(t− 1)
∑
{γ(i)j }
Pr
(
γ
(i)
j
) 1∣∣∣γ(i)j ∣∣∣ . (44)
In the steady-state ai(t) = ai(t − 1) = ai and qi(t) = qi(t − 1) = qi, and by replacing
eqs. (35) and (40) we obtain
ai = χh¯Γiki. (45)
Since the workers’ behaviors are independent from each other, the number of job appli-
cations received by firm i in any period follows the binomial
Pr(Ai) =
(
H
Ai
)
aAii (1− ai)H−Ai , (46)
where H is the agent population size, so the steady-state average number of applications Ai
(abusing notation) is
Ai = Hai = ϕh¯Γiki, (47)
where ϕ = Hχ. Ai fulfills the steady-state balance condition λLi = hiAi. Q.E.D.
D Proof of proposition 4
Let us consider the steady-state solution for the probability qi of being unemployed and
associated to firm i, as written in eq. (40). Given that the workers’ actions are independent
from each other, the evolution of the firm-specific unemployment follows the binomial
Pr(Ui) =
(
H
Ui
)
qUii (1− qi)H−Ui , (48)
so the steady-state average firm-specific unemployment Ui (abusing notation) is
Ui = Hqi =
ϕhiki
1− (1− v)ki , (49)
where ϕ = Hχ. Q.E.D.
D.1 Proof of proposition 7
Consider the probability oi(t) that a worker associated to firm i finds a job at a different
firm in period t. This event depends on: the probability qi(t − 1) that the worker was
unemployed and associated to firm i ∈ Γj during the previous period, on the probability
Pr(γi) of i having a configuration γi of open of closed neighbors; and on the probability of
choosing one particular firm over all other alternatives available in Γi. Altogether, these
factors constitute probability
oi(t) = qi(t− 1)
∑
γi 6=∅
Pr (γi)
1
|γi| . (50)
In the steady-state oi(t) = oi(t − 1) = oi and qi(t) = qi(t − 1) = qi, and by replacing
eqs. (36) and (40) we obtain
oi = χhih¯Γiki. (51)
Since the workers’ behaviors are independent from each other, the number of i’s outflows
in any period follows the binomial
Pr(Oi) =
(
H
Oi
)
oOii (1− oi)H−Oi , (52)
so the steady-state average outflows Oi (abusing notation) is
Oi = Hoi = ϕhih¯Γiki, (53)
where ϕ = Hχ. Oi fulfills the steady-state balance condition Oi = λLi. Q.E.D.
D.2 Estimation of separation rates for Finland
Year βλ N R
2
1988 0.188*** 34,279 0.407
(2.900e-02)
1989 0.102*** 32,771 0.301
(2.224e-02)
1990 0.105*** 25,260 0.246
(2.442e-02)
1991 0.049*** 19,143 0.252
(9.445e-03)
1992 0.028*** 16,810 0.141
(4.575e-03)
1993 0.188 17,667 0.174
(1.270e-01)
1994 0.150* 20,756 0.279
(7.513e-02)
1995 0.068*** 21,012 0.151
(1.759e-02)
1996 0.059*** 24,076 0.382
(6.019e-03)
1997 0.065*** 51,493 0.509
(8.652e-03)
1998 0.088*** 31,322 0.281
(1.590e-02)
1999 0.208* 33,648 0.409
(8.141e-02)
2000 0.154** 34,008 0.342
(4.993e-02)
2001 0.088*** 33,331 0.323
(1.667e-02)
2002 0.066*** 33,031 0.376
(1.103e-02)
2003 0.070*** 33,842 0.367
(1.041e-02)
2004 0.592*** 35,924 0.609
(1.528e-01)
2005 0.074*** 41,978 0.415
(1.029e-02)
2006 0.127*** 44,403 0.524
(3.286e-02)
2007 0.086*** 42,767 0.470
(1.171e-02)
Table 1: Estimation of annual separation rates for Finland via eq. (20). Robust standard
errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
